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IN THE NAME OF “JUSTICE”: SHIFFRAGREEN MOTIONS AND THEIR UNINTENDED
HARMS
Sexual assault victims face many barriers to reporting the violence they
have experienced. As few as one-third of sexual assaults are reported to the
police and even fewer result in criminal charges. The criminal justice system
can be grueling for sexual assault victims and carries with it the possibility of
testifying at trial in front of their perpetrators, an experience that is daunting
at best and terrifying at worst. Because of how few cases make it into the court
system, along with how difficult the process can be for victims, any legal
mechanisms that would create an unnecessary barrier to a victim participating
in the process must be critically examined. One such barrier in Wisconsin is
known as a Shiffra-Green motion. This motion received its name from two
separate criminal sexual assault cases that helped to shape the legal rules
around a defendant’s right to request access to privileged information, often
used to gain access to a victim’s mental health records. This Comment explores
where challenges to victims’ credibility originate, the legal privilege afforded
to victims’ records, and the evolution of federal and state law that gave birth to
the Shiffra-Green motion. Finally, the Comment concludes with
recommendations for Wisconsin to modify or eliminate the motion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment will unpack the history behind a legal tool available to
defendants in Wisconsin, the Shiffra-Green motion, in an attempt to shed light
on its harms and critically examine its legal justifications. What follows first is
an example of the harm caused by this mechanism. This example does not
represent any specific victim but rather is a composite of the victims whose
lives have been impacted by the Shiffra-Green motion and whose
victimizations are memorialized in the many cases that have reached the
appellate courts in Wisconsin.
M is a twenty-five-year-old woman1 living in Wisconsin who was sexually
abused by an uncle when she was a child. As a result, she struggles with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)2 and depression.3 One night, she is at a party
1. For this example, the victim is a woman; the reality of sexual violence is that it impacts
individuals of all genders and is perpetrated by both men and women. Fast Facts: Preventing Sexual
Violence,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION (June
22,
2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/sexualviolence/fastfact.html [https://perma.cc/6YX4-UGJ4].
2. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a disorder that can develop after an individual
experiences a traumatic event. Symptoms include nightmares, flashbacks, intrusive memories,
hypervigilance, intense anxiety, and avoidance of reminders of the traumatic event. Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/topics/ptsd# [https://perma.cc/6KFTMAP7].
3. “Depression is a mood disorder that occurs when feelings of sadness and hopelessness
continue for long periods of time . . . .” Depression, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/articles/depression [https://perma.cc/786M-5YQQ]. Depression is one of the
“most common” effects of sexual violence. Effects of Sexual Violence, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L
NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/effects-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/U86P-2AZP].
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and runs into her brother’s friend, P, who she knows and trusts. Although M
has a few drinks and is intoxicated, she is not so drunk that she is not aware of
her surroundings. M gets a ride home from the party from P who, instead of
dropping her off and leaving, comes into her apartment and rapes her. M is in
shock that someone she trusted would do this. She wonders how she could
experience sexual violence for the second time in her life and feels that the
assault must have been her fault for drinking or allowing him to come to her
apartment. M asks herself what she might have done or said that caused P to
rape her. She tells a close friend the next morning who believes her and
encourages her to go to the hospital to get checked out. M endures an exam
where a nurse collects evidence from her body. The exam is overwhelming and
invasive, and M struggles to comprehend her next steps. She is scared to go to
the police for fear they will blame her for the rape. She is also worried about
ruining P’s life or her relationship with her brother.
M eventually tells her brother, who does not believe her and blames her for
the sexual assault. He knows about M’s mental health struggles and questions
whether she was actually raped or if what she thinks happened was really a
flashback of the sexual abuse from her past. He confronts P, who denies raping
M. M’s brother shares his theory about M’s mental health struggles with P.
Devastated by her brother’s reaction, M starts to see a counselor and begins
to process what happened. She works through her self-blame and begins to
recognize that the rape was not her fault. Eventually, reporting to the police
becomes a more attractive option for healing and ensuring that P is not able to
rape others. Two months after the night of the party, M reports the rape to
police. The police investigate and charge P with sexual assault. Before trial, P
learns that M went to counseling prior to reporting to the police and recalls what
M’s brother said about her flashbacks and PTSD. P files a motion for the judge
to review her counseling records with the justification that they would contain
information about M’s mental health diagnoses and their impact on her ability
to distinguish a flashback from reality. The judge finds that P has provided
sufficient evidence to warrant an in camera4 review of M’s mental health
records. M is faced with an impossible choice. She can waive her privilege and
release her counseling records to the court knowing that they could be used to
attack her credibility, or she can refuse to waive her privilege and consequently
have her testimony barred, effectively ending the criminal case. By choosing
either option, M feels she will be retraumatized and let down by the criminal
justice system. She is left feeling as though she should have never reported the
rape.
4. An in camera review is where the judge reviews records privately in his or her chambers. In
Camera, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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Though the impact on M may be difficult to comprehend for those whose
lives have not been impacted by sexual violence, M’s retraumatization by the
system is not atypical. Unfortunately, our country has a long history of
struggling to effectively address incidents of sexual violence in a manner that
truly serves those victims who come forward.5
In Wisconsin, defendants in criminal sexual assault cases have a legal tool
at their disposal, a Shiffra-Green motion,6 which potentially allows access to
victims’ privileged counseling records and includes the consequence of victims
being silenced (their testimony barred) if they refuse to waive their privilege to
the records.
This Comment will critically examine the judicial and constitutional roots
of this mechanism and offer future directions for Wisconsin. Part II will explore
the problem of sexual violence and the historical roots of the judicial system
treating rape myths as valid justifications to challenge a victim’s credibility.
Part III will examine the federal and state foundations for therapist-client
privilege, including exceptions to privilege. Part IV will delve into Wisconsin’s
history in navigating exceptions to privilege and the path by which the ShiffraGreen motion came to be. Finally, Part V will explore possible future directions
for Wisconsin to move away from Shiffra-Green.

5. Though early American laws treated rape as a serious crime, the court system “found multiple
ways to minimize its prosecution against certain male subjects or citizens.” SHARON BLOCK, RAPE
AND SEXUAL POWER IN EARLY AMERICA 128 (2006). This had not drastically changed by the midtwentieth century, when “[j]udges and juries were often skeptical of women’s claims of rape, especially
those women who knew their attacker.” CATHERINE O. JACQUET, THE INJUSTICES OF RAPE: HOW
ACTIVISTS RESPONDED TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1950–1980, at 15 (2019). Despite there being
monumental changes in response to crime victims from the 1950’s to today (including a proud moment
for Wisconsin as the first state to pass a Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights), the legacy of our country
ineffectively addressing sexual assault is reflected in the small numbers of sexual assault victims whose
perpetrators receive a criminal charge and the even smaller number whose perpetrators are convicted.
OFF. OF VICTIMS OF CRIME, 2022 NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS WEEK RESOURCES GUIDE
(2022) https://ovc.ojp.gov/ncvrw2022/landmarks-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW5S-FYZK]; infra,
Part II.
6. The Shiffra-Green motion allows a defendant in a criminal case to request access to a victim’s
privileged records, with the justification that the records contain evidence that would be valuable to
the defense. If a victim refuses to disclose the record, he or she can be barred from testifying. 7 Daniel
D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence, § 511.2, at 451 (4th ed. 2017).
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHALLENGES TO RAPE VICTIMS’
CREDIBILITY
A. Sexual Assault: The Scope of The Problem
Sexual violence is widely recognized as a public health problem and has
serious and wide-ranging impacts for victims and communities.7 According to
a 2015 national survey, 43% of women and almost 25% of men in the United
States experienced some form of sexual violence (defined as “rape, being made
to penetrate someone else, sexual coercion, and/or unwanted sexual contact”)
in their lifetime.8 Sexual violence impacts victims, their friends and family
members, their communities, and society as a whole. Consequences for victims
can include (among many others) PTSD, flashbacks, panic attacks, self-harm,
eating disorders, sleep disturbances, depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts.9
Friends and family members are impacted as secondary victims and may
experience anger, shock, guilt, helplessness, as well as strain in their
relationship with the person who was assaulted.10 Given that the estimated
lifetime cost of rape is $122,461 per victim, the detrimental impact of sexual
assault on a community and on a societal level is evident, as is the need for it
to be prevented and its effects mitigated.11
Unfortunately, the criminal justice system, which is the primary method of
addressing sexual assault in the United States, is largely ineffective in holding
perpetrators accountable. Sexual assaults are vastly underreported, with only
16% to 32% of rape victims reporting the assault to police.12 The reasons why
a victim might decide not to report the sexual assault vary, but could include

7. Fast Facts: Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 1; Effects of Sexual Violence, supra note
3.
8. SHARON G. SMITH, XINJIAN ZHANG, KATHLEEN C. BASILE, MELISSA T. MERRICK, JING
WANG, MARCIE-JO KRESNOW & JIERU CHEN, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE SURVEY (NISVS): 2015 DATA BRIEF-UPDATED RELEASE 2–3 (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/2015data-brief508.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT5D-5X57].
9. Effects of Sexual Violence, supra note 3.
10. Courtney E. Ahrens & Rebecca Campbell, Assisting Rape Victims as They Recover from
Rape, 15 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 959, 960-62, 978 (2000).
11. Fast Facts: Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 1.
12. Estimates of rape reporting to law enforcement differ widely based on the methods used in
the survey; the less descriptive the question is in defining rape, the higher the percentage of reports are
(because fewer individuals identify that they were raped). Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne
Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault Cases: Future Directions for Research and
Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145, 146–48 (2012); RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L.
TRUMAN, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 6–7 (2020),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv19.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8BX-YX4G].
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fear of retaliation, not being believed, or being blamed for the assault.13 A
victim may also be deterred by either believing that the police cannot help or
by the possibility that the criminal justice system will revictimize them.14 Even
when victims overcome the barriers to reporting a sexual assault, they may not
obtain the justice they seek. It is estimated that only 25.6% of perpetrators of
rape are arrested.15 Of those arrested for committing rape, only 50% are
convicted of a felony and 8% are convicted of a misdemeanor.16
Understandably, many victims seek alternative methods of obtaining justice,
including restorative justice.17
Given the current inefficacy of our criminal justice system in achieving
justice for sexual violence victims, it is crucial to reduce barriers to a victim’s
participation in the process. One such barrier is the threat to a victim of being
forced to disclose counseling records to a judge, or even worse, these records
(or a description of their contents) being released to the defendant.
In Wisconsin, defendants in a sexual assault criminal case have a
mechanism known as a Shiffra-Green motion by which they can request the
judge to review the victim’s private, privileged treatment records in an attempt
to discover evidence that would support the defense, most often in challenging
the credibility of the victim.18 If a victim refuses to waive the privilege
protecting the records, he or she is barred from testifying.19 It is not difficult to
imagine how this process could harm a sexual assault victim. In fact, this
process has its roots in a criminal justice system that has historically harmed
victims.
B. The Legacy of Rape Myths and Fear of False Allegations
A victim’s fear of not being believed and being blamed for the rape are
unfortunately grounded in a historical reality of how rape allegations are
handled by the American criminal justice system. At the outset of the country’s
founding, if a woman came forward with a rape allegation, she was often
13. Sammy Caiola, How Rape Affects Memory and the Brain and Why More Police Need to
Know About This, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 21, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/ healthshots/2021/08/22/1028236197/how-rape-affects-memory-and-the-brain-and-why-more-police-needto-know-about-thi [https://perma.cc/6MQN-63QQ].
14. Id.
15. Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 12, at 150.
16. Id. at 154.
17. Ginny Graves, How a Radical Approach to Dealing with Sexual Assaults May Heal Trauma,
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.goodhousekeeping.com/life/a37234704/
restorative-justice/ [https://perma.cc/2K5W-SKVE].
18. Blinka, supra note 6, § 511.2, at 451–52.
19. Id.
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presumed to be lying until she was able to prove otherwise.20 This was not just
general cultural sentiment; justice of the peace manuals at the time stressed the
necessity to critically assess the credibility of the victim, citing the ease at
which false reports could be made.21 For example, if the victim reported that
the rape occurred in a place that was highly populated where presumably many
people would have overheard her struggle, if she did not cry for help and she
failed to come forward promptly after the rape, she would likely be seen as
fabricating the allegation.22
The characteristics of what was seen as a false allegation (e.g., delayed
reporting, lack of injury, a victim not fighting back against a perpetrator) are
now recognized to be rape myths.23 In fact, the belief that false allegations are
commonplace is a rape myth in itself, and estimates put false reporting rates at
only 2–8%.24 Rape myths persist and impact a victim’s experience with the
criminal justice system. When law enforcement personnel, crime lab analysts,
jurors, judges, and attorneys endorse these stereotypical beliefs about rape, it
can have negative consequences. For example, when they endorse rape myths,
police officers are more likely to approach a victim with skepticism and less
likely to investigate the assault thoroughly, and crime lab analysts are less likely
to process sexual assault evidence kits.25
It is impossible to separate historical (and current26) beliefs regarding false
allegations of rape from the issue at hand regarding defendants’ attempts to
access victims’ counseling records. Significantly, most of the foundational
criminal cases regarding a defendant’s right to request a victim’s confidential

20. BLOCK, supra note 5, at 131.
21. Id. at 129–30.
22. Id. at 130.
23. Olivia Smith & Tina Skinner, How Rape Myths are Used and Challenged in Rape and Sexual
Assault Trials, 26 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 441, 443–44 (2017).
24. KIMBERLY LONSWAY, JOANNE ARCHAMBAULT & DAVID LISAK, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE
RES. CTR., FALSE REPORTS: MOVING BEYOND THE ISSUE TO SUCCESSFULLY INVESTIGATE AND
PROSECUTE NON-STRANGER SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (2009), https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/
files/publications/2018-10/Lisak-False-Reports-Moving-beyond.pdf [https://perma.cc/666E-Y68M].
25. Smith & Skinner, supra note 23, at 443; Rebecca Campbell & Giannina Fehler-Cabral, “Just
Bring Us the Real Ones”: The Role of Forensic Crime Laboratories in Guarding the Gateway to
Justice for Sexual Assault Victims, 37 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3675, 3676–77 (2020).
26. Some police officers perceive false reporting rates to be as high as 30–50%. Dana Weiser,
Confronting Myths About Sexual Assault: A Feminist Analysis of the False Report Literature, 66 FAM.
REL. 46, 47 (2017).
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or privileged records both federally and in Wisconsin have stemmed from
incidents of sexual violence.27
When sexual assault victims are presumed to be lying, it seems justifiable
to attack their credibility in any way necessary, including mining their history
for evidence of mental illness or a pattern of dishonesty. Courts have
legitimized defendants’ attacks on victims’ credibility by granting in camera
reviews based on questionable justifications.28 This process appears to be
rooted in the belief that false allegations are commonplace, so a defendant must
gather all possible information to prepare a defense despite the slim likelihood
that the information gleaned from the in camera review would meaningfully
benefit the defense and regardless of the cost it may have to the victim or the
fact that the information could likely be found elsewhere (e.g., in crossexamining the victim). Courts have granted in camera reviews to examine a
victim’s mental health and treatment records on the grounds that a victim’s
depression or PTSD diagnosis impacted her ability to accurately recall the
assault or caused her to misinterpret the defendant’s behavior, that a victim’s
previous sexual assault made it difficult for her to distinguish flashback from
reality, that a victim’s previous reports of sexual assault were false and thus
proved she lied about the defendant raping her, and that a victim failed to
disclose the assault to a treatment provider so it must not have occurred.29
Generally, the assumption is that the records could contain evidence either that
the victim is not being truthful or was not capable of discerning the truth or
reality.30
The implication that a history of sexual assault or mental illness can alter a
victim’s memory such that he or she is not able to accurately report a sexual
assault is troubling. In reality, experiencing sexual violence increases a victim’s
risk for future victimization, with some estimates showing almost half of child
sexual abuse victims experiencing revictimization.31 Furthermore, it is the most
marginalized and vulnerable people, including those who have mental illness,
27. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 499
N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d 372, 564 N.W.2d 775 (1997); State v.
Green, 2002 WI 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298; State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, 348 Wis. 2d
450, 832 N.W.2d 609 (per curiam); State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89.
28. State v. Robertson, 2003 WI App 84, ¶ 27, ¶ 31, 263 Wis. 2d 349, 661 N.W.2d 105; Shiffra,
175 Wis. 2d at 603, 612; Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d at 375; State v. Lynch, 2015 WI App 2, ¶ 11, ¶ 36; State
v. Johnson, 2012 WI App 62, ¶ 4, ¶ 14.
29. Robertson, 2003 WI App 84, ¶ 27; Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612; Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d at 375;
Lynch, 2015 WI App 2, ¶ 11; Johnson, 2012 WI App 62, ¶ 4.
30. See Robertson, 2003 WI App 84, ¶ 27.
31. Hannah E. Walker, Jennifer S. Freud, Robyn A. Ellis, Shawn M. Fraine & Laura C. Wilson,
The Prevalence of Sexual Revictimization: A Meta Analytic Review, 20 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE
67, 70 (2017).
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who experience the highest rates of sexual violence.32 Paradoxically, the
characteristics (i.e., mental illness or previous experience of sexual assault) that
are seen as proving that a rape allegation is baseless are the same characteristics
that put an individual at greater risk for victimization of sexual assault. The
untenable situation this creates requires a critical examination of the legal
justifications for a mechanism that could result in a defendant gaining access to
a victim’s mental health records. This starts with an examination of privilege
and the evolution of exceptions to privilege.
III. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THERAPIST-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Therapist-Client Privilege for Sexual Assault Victims
The importance of privacy and privilege in the therapist-client relationship
is well-established. 33 Maintaining confidentiality of client communications and
records is an ethical obligation for social workers, counselors, and
psychologists.34 To establish the connection necessary to do the work of
therapy, a counselor must develop trust with a client, done in large part by
32. E.g., Lisa A. Goodman, Michelle P. Sayers, Kim T. Mueser, Stanley D. Rosenberg, Marvin
Swartz, Susan M. Essock, Fred C. Osher, Marian I. Butterfield & Jeffrey Swanson, Recent
Victimization in Women and Men with Severe Mental Illness: Prevalence and Correlates, 14 J. OF
TRAUMATIC STRESS 615, 616–17 (2001) (individuals with severe mental illness experience high rates
of recent and lifetime sexual assault); Responding to Transgender Victims of Sexual Assault, OFC. FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME (OVC) (June 2014), https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/pubs/forge/
sexual_numbers.html [https://perma.cc/K3WX-K8SQ] (half of transgender individuals experience
sexual violence at some point in their lifetime); LEIGH ANN DAVIS, THE ARC OF THE U.S., PEOPLE
WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 3 (2011), https://thearc.org/wp-content/
uploads/forchapters/Sexual%20Violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8ZN-55J7] (people with disabilities
experience higher rates of victimization, and those with intellectual disabilities experience the highest
rates of violent victimization); Jameta Nicole Barlow, Black Women, the Forgotten Survivors of Sexual
Assault,
A M.
PSYCHOL.
ASS’N:
IN
THE
PUBLIC
INTEREST
(Feb.
2020),
https://www.apa.org/pi/about/newsletter/2020/02/black-women-sexual-assault
[https://perma.cc/YTQ7-CBTB] (black women experience disproportionate rates of sexual violence).
33. The terms psychologist, counselor, therapist, psychotherapist, and social worker will be used
interchangeably as they all refer to providers of mental health interventions that require confidentiality.
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 4.01 (AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N
2017), https://www.apa.org/ethics/code [https://perma.cc/L4EZ-UXAN]; CODE OF ETHICS § B (AM.
COUNSELING ASS’N 2014) [hereinafter CODE OF ETHICS (ACA)], https://www.counseling.org/
resources/aca-code-of-ethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G5C-LC6Y]; CODE OF ETHICS § 1.07 (NAT’L
ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS
2021)
[hereinafter
CODE OF ETHICS (NASW)],
https://www.socialworkers.org/About/Ethics/Code-of-Ethics/Code-of-Ethics-English
[https://perma.cc/32C8-873A]. Additionally, Wisconsin’s privilege statute, section 905.04, applies to
professional counselors, psychologists, marriage and family therapists, and social workers. Wis. Stat.
§ 905.04 (2019–20), as amended by 2021 Wis. Act 22.
34. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 33, § 4.01;
CODE OF ETHICS (ACA), supra note 33, § B; CODE OF ETHICS (NASW), supra note 33, § 1.07.
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ensuring that the client’s privacy will be protected.35 This foundation of trust
and privacy is paramount for victims of violent crimes because victims need a
safe space to heal from the trauma they have experienced and process the
revictimization that many experience from navigating the criminal justice
system.36 To understand the value that legislatures and courts have given
therapist-client privilege and the need for counseling records to be protected,
one need only look toward its foundation in federal and state law. Though this
Comment focuses primarily on Wisconsin case law, it will also review federal
privacy protections and constitutional exceptions to these protections, as these
have helped to shape Wisconsin’s current state.
B. Federal Therapist-Client Privilege
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the United States Supreme Court held that
psychotherapist-client communications are privileged.37 Jaffee involved
therapy records of a defendant rather than a victim.38 The defendant was a
police officer who fatally shot a man and began seeing a clinical social worker
shortly after.39 In examining whether the defendant’s records should be
released, the Supreme Court reasoned that any loss of discoverable evidence if
the records are withheld is outweighed by the benefit of affording privilege to
the therapist-client relationship.40 The Court predicted that if therapy records
became discoverable it would have a chilling effect on the information that
individuals share with the therapist, particularly when the reason they are
receiving treatment has the potential to rise to litigation.41
Prior to this case coming before the Supreme Court in 1996, Rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence was the method by which privilege was
determined in federal courts.42 Rule 501 instructs federal courts to determine
whether privilege exists by interpreting common law “in the light of reason and
experience.”43 Without a clear designation, the United States Courts of
Appeals’ decisions varied in whether they granted privilege to client-

35. CODE OF ETHICS (ACA), supra note 33, § B.
36. Bridget M. McCafferty, The Existing Confidentiality Privileges as Applied to Rape Victims,
5 J.L. & HEALTH 101, 105–106 (1990).
37. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 11–12.
42. Id. at 7.
43. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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psychotherapist communications.44 Jaffee provided a clear path for clients and
therapists with respect to how they can expect their communication and records
to be treated in federal cases.
C. Wisconsin’s Privilege Statutes
Wisconsin codified privilege between patients and physicians in 1975 with
section 905.04 and extended this privilege to psychologists in 1977.45 Marriage
and family therapists, social workers, and professional counselors were added
to the privilege statute in 1992.46 Wisconsin’s privilege statute allows a client
to refuse to disclose confidential information generated or shared in the course
of treatment and allows the client to prevent anyone else from disclosing this
information.47 The statute outlines a number of exceptions to this privilege,
including certain types of proceedings and reports of child abuse or school
violence.48 Notably, the statute does not include an exception for a judicial order
or in camera review without consent.
Wisconsin also recognizes the particular importance of confidentiality and
privacy for victims of domestic violence or sexual assault.49 Enacted in 2002,
section 905.045 allows the communications and records that a victim of sexual
assault or domestic violence may have with an advocate to be protected from
disclosure.50 Unlike the privilege afforded to therapists and psychologists in
section 905.04, the victim-advocate privilege contains only two exceptions to
privilege, for a report of child abuse or a threat of violence at a school.51
D. Constitutional Justifications for Exceptions to Privilege
The privileges established in both federal and state forums are not absolute
and are subject to exceptions in cases where a criminal defendant shows that
information contained in a confidential record is material to establishing a

44. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 7. The Second and Sixth Circuits recognized privilege, while the Fifth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits did not recognize privilege. See In Re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1326
(2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d
1299, 1300 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753
(5th Cir. 1976).
45. 1975 Wis. Act 393; 1977 Wis. Act 61.
46. 1991 Wis. Act 160.
47. Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2) (2019–20).
48. Wis. Stat. § 905.04(4)(a), (am), (e), (em) (2019–20).
49. Wis. Stat. § 905.045(2) (2019–20).
50. Id.; 2001 Wis. Act 109.
51. Wis. Stat. § 905.045(4) (2019–20).
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defense.52 Proponents of exceptions to privilege argue that they are grounded
in a defendant’s constitutional rights; namely that they are grounded in the right
to compel a witness to testify, to confront an accuser, and the right to due
process.53 A brief discussion of each follows, as well as an examination of the
relative strength of the justifications as applied to a defendant’s access to a
victim’s privileged records.
i. Compulsory Process Clause
The compulsory process clause affords defendants in a criminal case the
right to “have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in [their] favor.”54 It
gives defendants the right to compel witnesses to testify during trial and has
been extended to the right of a defendant to present exculpatory evidence.55
Some scholars have argued that the compulsory process clause even goes so far
as to entitle a defendant to compel the testimony or discovery of evidence that
would be protected by privilege as long as it is exculpatory.56 Courts have held
that while there is a possibility that the compulsory process clause justification
affords this right, it has not been well-established and thus would not stand as
the sole constitutional basis for a defendant’s right to discovery of privileged
information.57
ii. Confrontation Clause
The confrontation clause gives defendants the right “to be confronted with
the witnesses against [them].”58 This has been interpreted to ensure the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine a witness under oath and in
front of a jury who then can assess the witness’s credibility.59 While defendants
have argued that this gives them the right to access exculpatory evidence in a
victim’s privileged records, this has been rejected by several courts, which held
that the clause did not afford a defendant the right to pretrial discovery.60
52. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987); State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 606–
07, 499 N.W.2d 719, 721–22 (Ct. App. 1993).
53. For example, see the defendants’ arguments and the courts’ analyses of a defendants’
constitutional rights in Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 45 and Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 605 n.1.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
55. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 151–52 (1974).
56. Id. at 161 (“No interest protected by a privilege is sufficiently important to outweigh the
defendant’s right to establish his innocence through the presentation of clearly exculpatory evidence.”).
57. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56; State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 45, 371 Wis. 2d 1 885 N.W.2d
89.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
59. Jerrilee Sutherlin, Indiana’s Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause, 9 IND.
L. REV. 418, 419 (1976).
60. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 53; Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 42.
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iii. Due Process Clause
Defendants are ensured due process through the United States
Constitution, which states, “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law . . . .”61 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this to require that prosecutors “comport with prevailing notions of
fundamental fairness.”62 Additionally, defendants must have “a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.”63 It is within the due process clause
that the Supreme Court found grounds for the defendant to request an in camera
review of confidential records in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.64
E. Federal Case Law Creating an Exception to Privilege: Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie
The United States Supreme Court analyzed the issue of a defendant’s
request for records that were protected by a qualified privilege statute in
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie. George Ritchie was charged with sexually abusing his
thirteen-year-old daughter.65 She reported the abuse and was referred to the
state child protective agency, Children and Youth Services (CYS).66 Ritchie
subpoenaed her records during discovery; CYS refused to comply with the
request and the trial court judge would not enforce the subpoena.67 Ritchie was
convicted on all counts.68 Although he was able to cross-examine his daughter
thoroughly during the trial, Ritchie claimed that the trial court violated the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and his due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to enforce the subpoena for CYS’s
records.69 The case reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that
Ritchie’s conviction was to be vacated and the case remanded to the lower court
where Ritchie would be entitled to review the entire CYS file.70 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.71
The Supreme Court held that Ritchie was entitled to have the records
reviewed in camera by the judge to determine if they contained evidence that

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
Id.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
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would have changed the outcome of the trial.72 The Court reasoned that,
although there are strong policy reasons to uphold privilege in these
circumstances, the statute at issue did not provide for unqualified privilege.73
Specifically, the statute allowed for information to be disclosed in response to
a court order:
(a) [R]eports made pursuant to this act including but not
limited to report summaries of child abuse . . . and written
reports . . . as well as any other information obtained, reports
written or photographs or x-rays taken concerning alleged
instances of child abuse in the possession of the department, a
county children and youth social service agency or a child
protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made
available to:
....
(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court
order.74
According to the Court, privilege does not always preclude disclosure of
information, particularly when a statute does not provide absolute privilege.75
Additionally, the Court held that the rights afforded to Ritchie under the
Compulsory Process Clause were no greater than those under the Due Process
Clause.76 Under the Due Process Clause, the Court held that Ritchie had the
right to request and obtain evidence that was material to a finding of guilt or
innocent, and this right was not completely barred by privilege, especially
because the privilege was qualified.77 In this case, to obtain an in camera review
of the privileged information, Ritchie had to demonstrate that if he had obtained
any evidence contained within the documents prior to the trial, there would have
been a “reasonable probability” that the case would have had a different
outcome.78 The Court went on to outline the appropriate procedure for a request
of privileged records: after a defendant has met the standard for materiality, the
judge could conduct an in camera review to determine if material evidence
exists in the records, and release to the defense if found.79

72.
73.
74.
issue).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 43 n.2 (emphasis added) (quoting the relevant portion of the Pennsylvania statute at
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 60.
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Even though Ritchie’s holding appeared to apply narrowly only to treatment
records protected by a qualified privilege statute and held by the state (not a
private third party), it was adopted in Wisconsin shortly after to apply to
privately held therapy records protected by an unqualified privilege statute.80
IV. A SERIES OF WRONG TURNS: SHIFFRA AND ITS PROGENY
Through a series of decisions, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and
Wisconsin Supreme Court applied Ritchie in a manner that went beyond what
was intended in the original holding. Wisconsin courts have determined that
Ritchie, which allowed access to a victim’s privileged records held by a state
agency based on a statute that contained a court order exception, applied to
privately held records protected by Wisconsin’s privilege statute, which
contains no such exception.81 In Ritchie, the Supreme Court distinguished the
statute in question which applied to records held by a state agency from the
state’s sexual assault counselor unqualified privilege statute, emphasizing the
fact that the state agency did not have unqualified privilege in holding the
victim’s records.82 The Court intentionally declined to extend the holding to
circumstances where a privilege statute is unqualified.83 Despite this,
Wisconsin courts applied Ritchie absent a thorough analysis or justification as
to why the holding served as precedent even though Wisconsin’s statute has no
exceptions to privilege.84 What follows is a review and analysis of the path
Wisconsin courts have taken in applying Ritchie and creating a mechanism by
which a defendant can request access to a victim’s mental health records.
A. Early Applications of Ritchie
The first Wisconsin case to apply Ritchie was In Interest of K.K.C., where
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that Ritchie entitled a criminal defendant
to an in camera review of confidential records by the court if those records were
determined to be material to the case.85 The records in question in K.K.C. were
juvenile records held by the Rock County Department of Social Services, a state
agency.86 The court decided that Ritchie would be applicable despite the
80. See State v. S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 738, 465 N.W.2d. 238, 241 (Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 606–07, 499 N.W.2d 719, 722 (Ct. App. 1993).
81. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 606–07; State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶ 31, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646
N.W.2d 298.
82. 480 U.S. at 57.
83. Id. at 57 n.14.
84. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 606-607; Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶ 31.
85. K.K.C. v. State (In Interest of K.K.C.), 143 Wis. 2d 508, 511, 411 N.W.2d. 142, 144 (Ct.
App. 1988).
86. Id. at 509.
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defendant having made no motion for an in camera review of the records at the
time of the appeal.87
Following K.K.C., the next published case to address Ritchie’s application
to confidential and privileged records was State v. S.H.88 S.H. was charged with
sexually assaulting his three children.89 Utilizing the procedure by which
parents can receive copies of their children’s treatment records, S.H. signed a
medical release form seeking his children’s privately held counseling records.90
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied the release of records based on the
medical release that S.H. signed because the records were privileged under
section 905.04.91 However, without an analysis of whether Ritchie extends to
privately held privileged records or an explicit intention to extend Ritchie’s
holding in this manner, the court ruled that Ritchie entitled S.H. to request an
in camera review of his children’s treatment records as long as he established
that the records contained information material to his defense.92 Similarly to
K.K.C., the court in S.H. decided that privately held, privileged records would
be subject to in camera review under Ritchie despite this issue not being
presented to the court (the defendant had moved for an in camera review but
failed to appeal that particular motion).93
B. Wisconsin’s Misapplication of Ritchie Solidified: State v. Shiffra
State v. Shiffra marked the first time an appeal directly requiring the issue
of Ritchie’s application was before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.94 A brief
review of the facts and procedural history are helpful to provide context for the
court of appeals’ decision. Shiffra was charged with sexually assaulting a
woman, Pamela P., at his apartment.95 Pamela reported the sexual assault to
police the same night it occurred.96 The day before the trial, Shiffra moved to
adjourn based on information he had obtained from the prosecution indicating
that Pamela “ha[d] a history of psychiatric problems which may [have]
affect[ed] her ability to perceive and relate truthful information.”97 The
adjournment was granted and Shiffra requested Pamela’s psychiatric records so
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 511.
State v. S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 738, 465 N.W.2d. 238, 241 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738.
Id.
State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 499 N.W.2d 719, 722 (Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 603.
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that he would “not be bound by [her] own self-reporting of the effects of her
psychiatric disorders on her ability to perceive and relate truthful testimony.”98
The state objected to an in camera review of the records on the grounds that
Pamela’s account was corroborated by other evidence and the records were
protected by absolute privilege by section 905.04.99 The trial court ruled in
Shiffra’s favor, finding that he presented sufficient evidence to show
materiality.100 The court gave Pamela the opportunity to waive her privilege
granted by section 905.04; when she declined to waive her privilege and release
her records for an in camera review, the court barred her from testifying.101 The
state appealed the trial court’s order barring Pamela from testifying.102
In an attempt to persuade the court to adopt a narrow application of
Ritchie’s holding, the State argued103 that because Pamela’s records were held
by a private counseling agency and protected by a statute that provided absolute
privilege, they differed from those in Ritchie which were protected by a statute
that provided qualified privilege and the records were held by a county
agency.104 The court rejected these arguments, citing the precedent set by
K.K.C. and S.H. as compelling it to apply Ritchie’s holding to privately held
privileged records such as the victim’s, and was unconvinced by the State’s
categorization of the application of Ritchie in these previous cases as dicta.105
Furthermore, the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to bar
Pamela’s testimony as a consequence for her refusal to waive the privilege to
her treatment records.106 The court reasoned that although there was other
evidence that the defendant could have utilized to bring the victim’s credibility
into question, it sufficed as grounds for an in camera review that her treatment
records could have contained additional information of greater “quality and
probative value” that might confirm the existing evidence.107 Therefore, the
court held that the sole appropriate sanction for Pamela’s refusal to submit her

98. Id.
99. Id. at 604.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 604–05.
102. Id.
103. The state also made two additional arguments regarding Ritchie that are not vital to this
analysis: first, it argued that the records were not in “direct nexus” with the sexual assault at issue
because the records were “temporally remote” from the incident; second, it argued that because Shiffra
involved a pretrial decision regarding materiality of the information in the records and Ritchie involved
a post-conviction analysis of materiality, the Ritchie’s reasoning could not be applied. Id. at 606.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 607.
106. Id. at 612.
107. Id. at 611 (emphasis omitted).
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treatment records was to bar her from testifying, thus protecting Shiffra’s right
to a fair trial.108 The State proposed an alternative sanction by which Pamela
would testify and the jury would be informed of her refusal to disclose the
records; the court rejected this sanction and argued that it was insufficient
because the jury could view it as “a reasonable exercise of her right to privacy
rather than an attempt to hide something material to the credibility of her
testimony.”109
The court established a standard by which a defendant could establish
materiality of information in a victim’s records to obtain an in camera review
but created some confusion by describing the standard in two different ways.
In one portion of the opinion the court said the defendant should show the
information in the records is “relevant and may be helpful to the defense or is
necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.”110 In the same opinion,
the court also describes the standard as requiring the records to be “relevant and
may be necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.”111 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court would later clarify this standard in 2001 in State v.
Green, discussed below.112
In the cases that followed Shiffra, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined
to address the issue of whether Ritchie applied to privately held treatment
records protected by a privilege statute that contains no exception for a judicial
order.113 In State v. Speese, decided in 1996, the supreme court cited the fact
that the questions regarding Ritchie were not fully briefed by the parties as
rationale for it declining to render an opinion on the issue.114 In the next case
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1997, State v. Solberg, the court
appeared to accept Shiffra’s application of Ritchie to privately held records
protected by privilege, and did not reference any objections to the contrary from
the State.115 In 2002 this trend continued in Rizzo, where the supreme court did
not mention Ritchie and instead simply applied Shiffra as the appropriate
precedent.116

108. Id.
109. Id. at 606 n.4.
110. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
112. State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶ 34, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.
113. See State v. Speese, 199 Wis. 2d 597, 614, 545 N.W.2d 510, 517 (1996); State v. Solberg,
211 Wis. 2d 372, 386, 564 N.W.2d 775, 781 (1997); State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶ 48, 250 Wis. 2d
407, 640 N.W.2d 93.
114. Speese, 199 Wis. 2d at 610 n.12.
115. Solberg, 211 Wis. 2d, 386–87.
116. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶¶ 48–53.
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Despite the fact that the supreme court either declined to address the issue
of applying Ritchie or failed to acknowledge the issue in these cases, Green
cited the decisions as binding precedent regarding Ritchie’s application to
privileged, privately held treatment records without analysis.117 Instead, the
Green court focused on clarifying the standard for obtaining records set by
Shiffra.118
C. Revisiting and Refining: State v. Green
Green was charged with sexually assaulting a thirteen-year-old girl who
had initially disclosed that he engaged in sexual contact and sometime later
disclosed that he had actually forced intercourse.119 Citing the fact that the
victim did not disclose the assault right away and did not initially disclose that
the incident involved penetration, Green requested an in camera review of the
victim’s counseling records.120 The trial court denied Green’s motion, and
Green appealed.121 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and
the case reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court.122
The court explored the standard for a defendant to establish the existence
of material evidence contained within a victim’s records.123 The court reviewed
a number of previous considerations or standards set by Shiffra and other
precedent for a defendant to request an in camera review including: (1) the
defendant must produce a “fact-specific evidentiary showing” outlining as
specifically as possible what information they are seeking from the records; (2)
it is not sufficient for the defendant to merely point out that the victim sought
counseling for sexual assault (whether previous or current); (3) the defendant
must reasonably investigate via other means first and then make an evidentiary
showing that goes beyond “mere speculation or conjecture”; and (4) the
information sought cannot just be cumulative to evidence already available.124
Finally, the court clarified some seemingly conflicting language in Shiffra
that obfuscated the standard of evidentiary showing for materiality that a
defendant must meet.125 The court in Shiffra had stated both that an in camera
review was justified when the defendant showed that the evidence in the records

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶ 21 n.4.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶¶ 2–6.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 9, 15.
Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 25.
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“may be helpful to the defense” and also that the evidence “may be necessary
to a fair determination of guilt or innocence.”126 The Green court determined
that a higher threshold is necessary, that a defendant must show that there is a
“reasonable likelihood that the records contain relevant information necessary
to a determination of guilt or innocence.”127 The court explained further that the
records will be considered “necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence”
if they create “a reasonable doubt that might not otherwise exist.”128 Once the
defendant establishes that there is sufficient basis for an in camera review, the
judge follows an even higher standard to determine whether the records should
be released to the defendant.129 This standard requires that the court determine
if the records hold “any relevant information that is ‘material’ to the defense.”130
Green established a clear standard for defendants to meet when requesting
an in camera review of victims’ privileged records. However, it was a missed
opportunity for the supreme court to revisit the rationale behind Shiffra and its
application of Ritchie. What follows next are two cases where the Wisconsin
Supreme Court attempted to correct the missteps in Shiffra and Green but failed
to reach a majority to enact meaningful change.
D. Two Decades After Shiffra: State v. Johnson
Twenty years after Shiffra, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the
application of Ritchie to privileged counseling records with a critical eye, albeit
with very little rationale or analysis.131 Johnson was charged with repeated
sexual assault of his stepdaughter from the time she was twelve to fifteen-yearsold.132 With the rationale that the case hinged on the victim’s testimony,
Johnson filed a Shiffra-Green motion for an in camera review of her counseling
records.133 Johnson justified the review by pointing out that the victim was in
counseling during the time that she alleged the abuse to have occurred and
because the purpose of counseling was to discuss difficulties she was having
with Johnson, it was likely that the records contained exculpatory evidence.134
The circuit court granted Johnson’s motion and the victim subsequently refused
to waive her privilege to her counseling records.135 The circuit court held that
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. ¶ 34 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id.
State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609 (per curiam).
State v. Johnson, 2012 WI App 62, ¶ 3, 341 Wis. 2d 492, 815 N.W.2d 407.
Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
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the victim would not be compelled to produce her records and also would not
be barred from testifying.136 Instead, the circuit court developed an alternative
to barring the victim’s testimony: the jury would be informed that she had been
ordered by the court to produce her counseling records and that she had refused
to waive her privilege.137 The jury would also be instructed to presume that the
records contained information favorable to the defense as a result of her refusal
to waive her privilege.138
The case reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which addressed three
issues: (1) should Shiffra be overruled; (2) if not, did Johnson meet his burden
for an in camera review of the victim’s records; and (3) could the circuit court
require that the victim release her privileged records?139 The majority of the
court could not agree on overruling Shiffra, but showed some willingness to
depart from precedent by holding that, despite her refusal to waive her
privilege, the victim need not be barred from testifying.140 The court also held
that the victim could not be compelled to produce her counseling records.141
Johnson and the State moved the court to reconsider to provide clarification
because the previous opinion “left the parties and the circuit court without
sufficient guidance or ability to proceed consistent with precedent.”142 The
court then held that because it remained deadlocked, the court of appeals’
decision (which required that the victim’s testimony be barred143) stood.144 The
court reiterated that there was no majority to overrule Shiffra and precedent
required that the victim’s testimony be barred when she refused to waive the
privilege to her records.145 Only one of the five justices would have overturned
Shiffra.146 Justice Bradley concurred in part and dissented in part and expressed
her disagreement with the court’s characterization of its previous opinion.147
Significantly, Justice Bradley noted that neither Shiffra nor Green mandated
that victims’ testimonies be barred if they refuse to release their records for an
in camera review, but rather that Shiffra only required that there be some sort
136. Id. ¶ 9.
137. Id. ¶ 1.
138. Id.
139. State v. Johnson, 2013 WI 59, ¶¶ 2–4, 348 Wis. 2d 450, 832 N.W.2d 609 (per curiam).
140. Id. ¶ 6–7.
141. Id.
142. State v. Johnson, 2014 WI 16, ¶ 2, 353 Wis. 2d 119, 846 N.W.2d 1 (per curiam) (opinion
on reconsideration).
143. Johnson, 2012 WI App 62, ¶ 19.
144. Johnson, 2014 WI 16, ¶ 1.
145. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
146. Id. ¶ 9.
147. Id. ¶ 15.

ADLER_21NOV22.DOCX

264

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:243

of remedy and was not proscriptive on what that must be.148 Ultimately, the
Shiffra-Green process remained intact.
E. A Deeper Look at Shiffra and a Court Divided: State v. Lynch
Soon after the second Johnson case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court once
again tackled the question of whether Shiffra should stand as precedent.149
Lynch was charged with multiple counts of sexually assaulting a child.150 The
sexual assault report and charges came years after the actual incidents, and the
victim reported that the abuse occurred around the same time she was sexually
assaulted by her father (who had been convicted of the abuse).151 Lynch moved
for an in camera review of the victim’s mental health records from 1993 to
2011, asserting that the records would demonstrate that “(1) the complainant
exhibit[ed] ongoing symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder, which he
argue[d] affect[ed] her memory; (2) the complainant did not report Lynch to
any treatment providers as a child; and (3) the complainant ha[d] sociopathic
personality disorder, a symptom of which is frequent lying.”152 The circuit court
found that Lynch provided sufficient evidence to merit an in camera review,
and the victim refused to waive her privilege to her records.153 The State
appealed, the court of appeals upheld the circuit court’s findings, and the State
appealed again to the supreme court.154
The supreme court was once again divided on whether Shiffra should be
overturned and whether barring a victim’s testimony is the appropriate remedy
for a victim’s failure to release records for an in camera review.155 Justice
Gableman presented the plurality opinion of the court, representing three of the
seven justices.156 Justice Gableman outlined that he, Chief Justice Roggensack,
and Justice R.G. Bradley would overturn Shiffra.157 He proceeded to critically
analyze the legal justifications outlined in Shiffra and concluded that Shiffra
should not have been decided as it was.158
Specifically, the plurality explained that, although due process requires that
a defendant be able to present a meaningful defense and a defendant has a right
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. ¶ 19.
State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 2, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (plurality opinion).
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14–15.
Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
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to exculpatory evidence held by the State, this does not extend to a victim’s
privileged records.159 It also explored the journey from Shiffra to the present
case and criticized both the extension of Ritchie to privately held, privileged
records and the adoption of that precedent.160 The court pointed out that, even
without access to privileged records, defendants still have the opportunity to
build a meaningful defense both because the prosecution has an obligation to
turn over exculpatory evidence and because defendants have the opportunity to
cross-examine and call witnesses at trial to challenge the credibility of the
victim.161
The remaining members of the court varied on how the case should be
decided. Justice Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley outlined in their
partial dissent that they would not overturn Shiffra because there was no
reasonable justification to depart from precedent.162 They instead would have
the court compel the victim to produce the privileged records rather than bar
her testimony.163 Justice Prosser would not overturn Shiffra, and although he
recognized the issues that the process potentially creates in forcing victims to
waive their privilege to counseling records or have their testimony barred, he
advocated for adapting Shiffra-Green instead of abandoning it.164 Finally,
Justice Ziegler expressed that she would maintain Shiffra and its progeny,
including the remedy of barring the victim’s testimony.165 Because the court
was divided, the lower court’s decision stood, and Shiffra-Green remained the
controlling authority.
V. WHERE ARE WE NOW? RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Wisconsin courts have thus far allowed the Shiffra-Green mechanism for
defendants to request victims’ records to survive. This has created the untenable
situation where Wisconsin sexual assault victims are potentially forced to
159. Id. ¶ 54.
160. Id. ¶¶ 36, 39.
161. Id. ¶¶ 69–71.
162. The reasons the court departs from precedent include “changes or developments in the law
that undermine the rationale behind a decision; the need to make a decision correspond to newly
ascertained facts; a showing that a decision has become detrimental to coherence and consistency in
the law; a showing that a decision is unsound in principle; and a showing that a decision is unworkable
in practice.” Id. ¶¶ 94–95 (Abrahamson & Ann Walsh Bradley, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶ 51 n.16, 294 Wis.
2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729).
163. The justices relied on a state statute classifying patient records as confidential, stating that
the court could utilize this to compel the victim to produce the records. Id. ¶ 120 (Abrahamson & Ann
Walsh Bradley, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Id. ¶ 181 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
165. Id. ¶ 193 (Ziegler, J., dissenting).

ADLER_21NOV22.DOCX

266

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:243

choose between disclosing their privileged records or having their testimony
barred. Moving forward, Wisconsin has a couple of different directions it can
pursue to prevent or mitigate the harm done by the Shiffra-Green process,
including overturning Shiffra or allowing alternative remedies outside of
barring a victim’s testimony.
A. The Ideal Path: Overturn Shiffra
The most effective solution to restoring privilege protections for victims in
Wisconsin lies with the courts in overturning Shiffra. As Justice Gableman
outlined in Lynch, there is no constitutional right to discovery of privileged
records.166 Thus, Shiffra’s extension of Ritchie to privately held, privileged
records was incorrect.167 Furthermore, some scholars suggest that courts should
not even consider a defendant’s request for privileged records held by a third
party, and that no balancing test is required.168 This approach has been adopted
by a number of states that have held that privilege cannot be trumped by the
defendant’s right to a meaningful defense because the privilege is absolute.169
Overturning Shiffra would be the best way to ensure that the harmful process
of defendants forcing victims to disclose their privileged records would not
continue.
B. The Next Best Option: Pursue Other Remedies Outside of Barring the
Victim’s Testimony
If the Wisconsin Supreme Court will not overturn Shiffra, the next best
option is to adopt alternative remedies to barring a victims’ testimony if they
refuse to disclose their records. Though it was not adopted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, the circuit court in Johnson proposed such a remedy.170 The
jury would be informed that a victim both refused to waive his or her privilege
and disclose the requested records, and the jury would be instructed to presume
166. Id. ¶ 54.
167. Id. ¶ 31.
168. Wendy J. Murphy, Privacy Rights in Mental Health Counseling: Constitutional Confusion
and the Voicelessness of Third Parties in Criminal Cases, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 387, 391
(2011).
169. People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 992–93 (Cal. 1997) (adopting absolute psychologistpatient privilege); People v. Tauer, 847 P.2d 259, 261 (Colo. App. 1993) (adopting absolute
psychologist-patient privilege); Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901, 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (absolute
psychotherapist-patient privilege); People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 86 (Ill. 1988) (absolute rape crisis
counselor privilege); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290, 1290 (Pa. 1992) (absolute sexual
assault counselor-victim privilege); Jennifer L. Hebert, Mental Health Records in Sexual Assault
Cases: Striking a Balance to Ensure a Fair Trial for Victims and Defendants, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1453,
1466 n.109 (2005) (noting the same).
170. State v. Johnson, 2012 WI App 62, ¶ 1, 341 Wis. 2d 492, 815 N.W.2d 407.
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that the records contained information favorable to the defense.171 While this
alternative is not ideal, it at least still allows the victim to testify and the case to
continue.
C. Promising Changes Ahead? A Shift in the Court’s Composition
Change to the Shiffra-Green process is largely in the hands of the courts,
which have failed to alter Shiffra-Green in the nearly three decades since the
standard was established. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not revisited
Shiffra-Green since 2016 with Lynch. However, the court’s composition has
changed in the last six years. Justice Patience D. Roggensack and Justice
Rebecca G. Bradley remain on the court, and both had endorsed the need to
overturn Shiffra.172 On the other hand, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Chief
Justice Annette Ziegler also remain on the court and both had expressed the
need to follow Shiffra as precedent.173 More importantly, Justice Rebecca
Dallet, Justice Brian Hagedorn and Justice Jill Karofsky have joined the court
since Lynch. Unless the justices from the Lynch court significantly shift their
positions, the addition of Justices Dallet and Karofsky might mean reform for
the Shiffra-Green motion. Justice Dallet has been described as “tak[ing] care to
protect the innocent and . . . victims” which could indicate that she would rule
in favor of overturning the harmful precedent.174 Additionally, Justice
Karofsky’s history of working with crime victims may also favor her supporting
reform for Shiffra. 175 Finally, although it is unclear whether Justice Hagedorn
would support departing from the court’s precedent here (he tends to side with
both the conservative and liberal justices176), if Justices Dallet and Karofsky
were to join Justices Roggensack and R.G. Bradley to create a majority, Shiffra
could likely be overturned regardless.

171. Id.
172. State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 7, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (plurality opinion).
173. Id.
174. Molly Beck, Dallet Has a History of Hearing Tough Cases, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 25, 2018, at
A.10.
175. Shawn Johnson, Judge Jill Karofsky Promotes Progressive Values in Wisconsin Supreme
Court Run, WIS. PUB. RADIO: SWING STATE (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.wpr.org/judge-jill-karofskypromotes-progressive-values-wisconsin-supreme-court-run [https://perma.cc/9DDZ-9HCP].
176. Laurel White, Experts: Slimmer Conservative Majority on Wisconsin Supreme Court Could
Unite Justices, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 4, 2020) https://www.wpr.org/experts-slimmer-conservativemajority-wisconsin-supreme-court-could-unite-justices [https://perma.cc/58U3-MRDC].
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D. A Final Note on the Value of a Victim’s Records to a Meaningful Defense
Justice Ziegler predicted that, if the court were to overturn Shiffra, “[t]he
potential for error . . . [would be] substantial.”177 Assuming that she is referring
to the error of failing to allow a defendant access to exculpatory evidence in a
victim’s records and the defendant being wrongfully convicted as a result, it is
not clear that there is a substantial potential for this to occur. First, false
allegations of sexual assault, as previously noted, are low.178 Additionally,
defendants have alternative methods to build a meaningful defense and
challenge victims’ credibility, as noted in Lynch.179 Finally, it is unclear that
there is any likelihood that victims’ records contain exculpatory evidence.
Further research into how many Shiffra-Green motions lead to in camera
reviews and how many of these in turn lead to the court disclosing the records
would be useful. If Wisconsin chooses to maintain Shiffra-Green, it is critical
to evaluate its utility.
VI. CONCLUSION
Crime victims in Wisconsin, particularly sexual assault victims, deserve
better protections for their privileged records. What started with the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Ritchie to provide a narrow exception to
allow access for records held by a state agency under a qualified privilege
statute has mutated in Wisconsin to a broad exception allowing access to
privately held counseling records protected under an unqualified privilege
statute. Rather than maintain an additional barrier to victims’ participation in
the criminal justice system, Wisconsin must turn to reform. Without it, the
system will continue to unintentionally harm victims.
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177. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶ 230 (plurality opinion).
178. Lonsway, Archambault & Lisak, supra note 24.
179. The court points out that defendants can still build a meaningful defense with the following:
(1) the presumption of innocence until proven guilty; (2) “the right to physically confront and crossexamine witnesses as well as . . . compel the attendance of witnesses at trial;” (3) the prosecutor’s
“constitutionally-mandated duty to disclose to the defendant exculpatory evidence;” (4) the ability to
“call other witnesses [to] . . . testify about the complainant’s character for truthfulness;” and, (5)
mandatory reporting laws, which would allow the defendant to “ask a treatment provider who would
have been subject to the mandatory reporting requirement if he or she ever reported the defendant to
the authorities.” Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶¶ 68–72.
* J.D., expected 2024, Marquette University Law School. Thank you to my husband, friends,
and family who listened, encouraged, and patiently challenged procrastination throughout my time in
law school. This Comment is dedicated to the countless survivors of violence I have met as an
advocate, counselor, family member, and friend.

